Entities, events, states, traits, tropes, times, situations, occasions, properties, possible worlds, kinds, degrees, forces, dispositions, intentions, abilities, attitudes, propositions....
Type-driven rules of composition, semantically interpretable syntactic features, conceptual operations, controlled vs. automatic processes...
Causation, predication, categorization, actionality, temporality, genericity, modality, evidentiality, the mass/count distinction, plurality/pluractionality, possession, conditionals and counterfactuality...
Formalism is crucial to constrain the theory space.
We have no a priori commitment to parsimonious ontologies: The ontology may include relationships, types, functions or entities that were not initially captured with traditional logical/formal tools, and the grammar may make reference to these with atoms even if they are analyzed further by a conceptual system.
Linguistic structure and morphology provide clues to the structure of meaning, which in turn provides information about the ontology.
Improved theories of ontology should improve theories of syntax and semantics.
Simple morphosyntax implies that any semantic complexity is in cognition, not language.
Mappings between linguistic predicates and conceptual properties are not necessarily the identity mapping.
We can ask whether any particular bit of complexity is in language or in cognition.
Theoretical linguists should be able to provide sources of hypotheses for cognitive researchers to pursue, and the results should in turn inform linguistic theory.
Working across differing ontological commitments is not always easy but valuable.
We make efforts to facilitate intra- and interdisciplinary communication in the face of terminological, sociological, and pedagogical barriers.
It is absolutely necessary to examine less-familiar languages when making claims about language vs. cognition.